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I NEVER FORGET A FACE:  NEW JERSEY SETS 
THE STANDARD IN EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION REFORM 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Employed at age seventeen with no criminal background, Marlon 
was a productive member of his local high school, studying to be an 
electrical sound engineer through an apprentice program.1  But any 
dreams and aspirations were shattered when he was identified at a 
“show-up” identification on March 25, 2011.2  On that evening, Marlon 
was wearing a bright orange vest and waiting for the Green Line Train, a 
part of the Chicago Transit Authority’s train system, with his friend 
Jonas after picking up his paycheck.  At this moment, Marlon found 
himself at “the wrong place at the wrong time.” 
After riding on the Blue Line in the same train car as a group of other 
African American and Hispanic individuals, Marlon and Jonas exited the 
train to transfer to the Green Line and waited on the upper level 
platform.  While they were waiting, police testimony and reports 
indicate that a group of five or six black youth surrounded, assaulted, 
and robbed a twenty-two year old Hispanic man, Louis Fuentes, on the 
lower platform.  After the assault, the youth fled to the upper level 
platform.  Police arrived minutes later, interviewed witnesses who were 
on the scene, and then searched for the group of five perpetrators on the 
upper platform.  The police found Marlon and Jonas waiting peacefully 
for the next train and arrested them.  Marlon tried to explain that he had 
just come from work and even showed them his paycheck, but the 
officers arrested these two black youth anyway.  Subsequently, the police 
led Marlon to the ambulance where Fuentes remembered Marlon’s 
orange vest and identified him as one of his attackers. 
Unfortunately, many state courts rarely exclude such identifications, 
and Marlon’s judge chose not to exclude this one.  Marlon’s case is still 
pending, and he will likely be convicted of attempted robbery, among 
other things, in large part because of the eyewitness identification.  
Marlon’s conviction will ultimately be decided by a jury, but the 
overwhelming evidence shows that jurors place substantial weight on 
eyewitness testimony regardless of its lack of reliability.3  After 
                                                 
1 Because the case is still pending, “Marlon” is not the individual’s real name.  It has 
been changed for confidentiality reasons and because Marlon is a juvenile. 
2 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (explaining that a show-up identification 
occurs when an officer apprehends a suspect, brings the suspect before the witness, and 
subsequently asks the witness to make an identification). 
3 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Timothy P. O’Toole & Catharine F. Easterly, Juror 
Understanding of Eyewitness Testimony:  A Survey of 1000 Potential Jurors in the District of 
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reviewing 250 DNA exonerations in the past thirty years, researchers 
have found that eyewitness identification played a contributing role in 
seventy-five percent of those convictions.4  Consequently, state courts 
                                                                                                             
Columbia 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Survey], https://www.westshore.edu/personal/ 
jrpoindexter/sociology/PDS%20Poll%20-%20Juror%20Knowledge%20of%20Eyewitness% 
20Factors%20-%20article%20by%20Dr.%20Elizabeth%20Loftus%20and%20Tim%20-
O'Toole.pdf (“[J]urors actually suffer from a basic misunderstanding of how memory 
generally works, and similarly do not understand how particular factors, such as the effects 
of stress or the use of a weapon, affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.”); see also 
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is almost 
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the 
defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”).  See generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & MARGARET BULL 
KOVERA, EVALUATING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 3 (2010) (noting that an eyewitness 
identification may be the only evidence connecting the suspect to the crime and suggesting 
that eyewitnesses often have an extremely difficult task because they have little to gain and 
may even feel that their individual safety may be threatened by the individual they are 
accusing); Christian Sheehan, Note, Making the Jurors the “Experts”:  The Case for Eyewitness 
Identification Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651, 674 (2011) (noting that jury instructions 
are the best way to educate jurors about the dangers of eyewitness testimony because 
expert testimony is often available only to wealthy defendants, creating a situation in 
which indigent defendants receive little of its benefit). 
4 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 6–11, 48 (2011) (suggesting that after reviewing the cases of the 
250 individuals who were exonerated he has identified patterns in how criminal 
prosecutions typically go wrong, including:  false confessions, unreliable eyewitness 
identifications, flawed forensic evidence, dishonest informants, ineffective defense counsel, 
inability to appeal, the extended period of time it takes to be exonerated, and the reluctance 
of the criminal justice system as a whole to respond); see also Sheehan, supra note 3, at 653 
(“Despite growing proof of the inaccuracy of traditional eyewitness identifications, 
eyewitnesses remain powerful tools for law enforcement as nearly 80,000 suspects are 
targeted each year based on eyewitness reports.”); Fact Sheet, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Eyewitness_Identification_Reform.php (last 
visited July, 28 2012) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (explaining that eyewitness misidentifications 
are the leading factor in wrongful convictions and suggesting reform in the following areas 
by:  (1) using a double blind procedure/blind administrator; (2) instructing the witness that 
“the suspect may or may not be present in the lineup”; (3) composing the lineup in a 
manner that does not bring unreasonable attention to the defendant; (4) taking a confidence 
statement immediately following the identification; and (5) recording the entire lineup 
procedure).  See generally PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, THE INNOCENTS (2003) (telling 
the stories of fifty individuals who were wrongfully convicted and suggesting that there 
are countless others who remain behind bars because of prosecutors who refuse to agree to 
post-conviction DNA testing and Congress who has not passed legislation ensuring that 
defendants have the right to DNA testing); Jessica A. Levitt, Note, Competing Rights Under 
the Totality of the Circumstances Test:  Expanding DNA Collection Statutes, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 
117 (suggesting that all fifty states adopt legislation allowing DNA samples to be collected 
from arrestees); 250 Exonerated:  Too Many Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT 3 (2011) 
[hereinafter 250 Exonerated], http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject 
_250.pdf (finding that the 250 exonerated individuals spent an average of thirteen years in 
prison individually before they were exonerated and collectively spent 3,160 years behind 
bars). 
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must consider whether there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent 
the damaging effects of erroneous eyewitness testimony.5 
New Jersey has taken the lead on this issue and recently established 
new guidelines.6  First, this Note describes the variables that implicate 
eyewitness accuracy and how jurors understand these variables.7  This 
Note also examines how the Supreme Court has dealt with the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications and discusses the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s new approach.8  Second, this Note evaluates the 
Supreme Court’s current approach in light of modern scientific data and 
compares it to New Jersey’s approach.9  Last, this Note proposes that 
each state adopt a modified version of New Jersey’s approach.10 
                                                 
5 See infra Part IV (suggesting that state courts adopt a modified version of New Jersey’s 
approach); see also Sheehan, supra note 3, at 653–54 (acknowledging that the legal system 
has attempted to address this issue through various procedural safeguards but recognizing 
that these safeguards do not address the psychological factors affecting memory); Scott E. 
Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 461 
(1989) (“Whether treated as a moral, constitutional, or popular sentiment inquiry, the 
greater injustice is almost universally seen in the conviction of the innocent.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
6 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (departing from the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence and announcing a more comprehensive framework, which 
incorporates modern scientific data).  See generally Adam Liptak, 34 Years Later, Supreme 
Court Will Revisit Eyewitness IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/us/23bar.html (pointing to the a report compiled 
at the request of New Jersey’s Supreme Court as potential guidance for the Supreme Court 
in the future); Troy Davis Execution Fuels Eyewitness ID Debate, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2011, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-09-27/troy-davis-eyewitness-
testimony/50563754/1 [hereinafter Troy] (noting that the Supreme Court had not ruled on 
the issue of eyewitness identification since 1977 and anticipating a change in its 
jurisprudence); Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Rules are Changed on Witness IDs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/nyregion/in-new-jersey-
rules-changed-on-witness-ids.html (estimating that New Jersey’s decision will have a 
national impact because New Jersey is a leading authority in the area of criminal law); 
Editorial, What Did They Really See? N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/27/opinion/what-did-eyewitnesses-really-see.html (urging the Supreme Court to 
“pay close attention” to New Jersey’s recent decision).  But see Perry v. New Hampshire, 
132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (declining to substantially revise its eyewitness identification 
jurisprudence). 
7 See infra Part II.A (explaining how the infrastructure of the criminal justice system 
along with psychological variables affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification). 
8 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the last thirty 
years and explaining how New Jersey separated itself from the Supreme Court’s 
approach). 
9 See infra Part III (suggesting that the Supreme Court has failed to incorporate thirty 
years of scientific data and examining the strengths and weaknesses of New Jersey’s 
approach to eyewitness identification). 
10 See infra Part IV (suggesting that New Jersey still needs to rid itself of some of the 
vestiges of the traditional Supreme Court approach). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
An eyewitness’s memory is not infallible; rather, scientific research 
suggests that memory is susceptible to distortion depending on the 
presence of certain variables.11  But even if memory was always 
dependable, the criminal justice system and its procedures are not.12  
Part II.A examines the various factors affecting the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification.13  Part II.B summarizes the Supreme Court’s 
approach to eyewitness identification and also discusses New Jersey’s 
manner of dealing with questionable eyewitness identifications.14 
A. Eyewitness Accuracy:  Variables and More Variables 
Memory functions differently depending on a plethora of different 
variables, all of which can affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.15  
First, Part II.A.1 discusses the competing commitments to truth-seeking 
in the criminal justice system.16  Next, Part II.A.2 analyzes memory and 
the ways in which it may be affected depending on the particular 
circumstances.17  Third, Part II.A.3 considers police procedure and how it 
                                                 
11 See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the variables that affect memory); see also Loftus et al., 
supra note 3, at 4–5 (“[H]uman memory is more selective than a video camera; the sensory 
environment contains a vast amount of information but the memory process perceives and 
accurately records only a very small percentage of that information. . . .  [H]uman memory 
can change in dramatic and unexpected ways.”); Calvin TerBeek, A Call for Precedential 
Heads:  Why the Supreme Court’s Eyewitness Identification Jurisprudence is Anachronistic and 
Out-of-Step with the Empirical Reality, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 21, 24–27 (2007) (providing a 
thorough outline of the relevant factors that affect a witness’s memory). 
12 See infra Part II.A.1, 3 (discussing the various professions and procedures that 
contribute to the accuracy of an identification); see also Steven J. Joffee, Comment, Long 
Overdue:  Utah’s Incomplete Approach to Eyewitness Identification and Suggestions for Reform, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 443, 447–49 (2010) (providing an overview of the ways in which police 
procedure may influence a witness’s identification); Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting 
Innocence Reform:  Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 723–27 
(2006) (discussing the competing goals and interests of law enforcement, defense lawyers, 
and prosecutors and maintaining that these three groups are sometimes only partially 
committed to truth seeking). 
13 See infra Part II.A (analyzing the various factors that may affect how a witness 
remembers a particular event and examining how jurors understand these variables). 
14 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification 
jurisprudence and New Jersey’s approach). 
15 See Part II.A (discussing these variables). 
16 See infra Part II.A.1 (providing a general overview of the moral professional 
commitments of law enforcement, defense attorneys, and prosecutors). 
17 See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the three stages of memory and factors that affect each 
stage). 
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affects the reliability of an identification.18  Last, Part II.A.4 discusses 
juror understanding of these variables.19 
1. Variables in the Commitment to Truth-Seeking 
At least theoretically, the common goal of convicting the guilty and 
freeing the innocent is what motivates law enforcement personnel, 
defense attorneys, and prosecuting attorneys.20  However, in reality, 
conflicting professional commitments may leave these groups only 
partially committed to seeking the truth in each and every case.21  Thus, 
the admissibility of an eyewitness identification may depend, at least 
partly, on the moral imperative of the three groups involved.22  Police 
officers, in particular, face unique challenges while pursuing truth in this 
country’s criminal justice system.23 
                                                 
18 See infra Part II.A.3 (describing the effect of commonly used police procedures). 
19 See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the average juror’s knowledge of how memory works 
in relation to an identification). 
20 Kruse, supra note 12, at 723 (“DNA exonerations have served as a rallying point for 
problem-solving approaches to criminal justice reform because they remind diverse 
stakeholders, whose interests and viewpoints are most often at odds in the highly 
adversarial context of the criminal justice system, of their common interest in ensuring 
accurate convictions.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t 
is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).  See generally 
GARRETT, supra note 4, at 182 (“Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through 
it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession.  Many are plainly harmless; some 
appear ominously harmful.”); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:  
The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 198 (1983) (“At least in 
theory, our system prefers erroneous acquittals over erroneous convictions.”); Mirjan 
Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:  A 
Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 576 (1973) (“Unfortunately, there is a conflict 
between these two desires:  the more we want to prevent errors in the direction of 
convicting the innocent, the more we run the risk of acquitting the guilty.”); Alexander 
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 198 (1997) (discussing the history of the 
constitutional value scheme, which embraces a presumption of innocence). 
21 See infra Part II.A (outlining the professional commitments of law enforcement, 
defense attorneys, and prosecutors). 
22 See generally MODEL RULES of PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004) (outlining the duties and 
responsibilities of prosecutors and holding them to a higher standard because of the 
considerable discretion inherent in their position); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond 
Justifications:  Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1258 
(1993) (explaining that most public defenders are motivated by a deep sense of 
discontentment with the current justice system, which compels them to vigorously defend 
both the guilty and innocent in the system); Robert K. Olson, Miscarriage of Justice:  A Cop’s 
View, 86 JUDICATURE, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 74, 74 (illustrating the complexities and conflicts of 
interest involved in the life of a police officer). 
23 See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing some of the challenges facing 
police officers). 
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Law enforcement personnel are committed to preserving the safety 
of the general public who abide by the law and apprehending those who 
jeopardize the safety of the public by breaking the law.24  Consequently, 
the motivating moral imperative is to punish lawbreakers who threaten 
the safety of others.25  The values of public safety and truth-telling may 
compete for the commitment of law enforcement in certain instances, 
especially when defense attorneys are waiting to exploit each and every 
procedural shortcoming.26 
Criminal defense lawyers are committed to preserving the rights of 
the accused individual, regardless of innocence or guilt.27  The defense 
                                                 
24 Kruse, supra note 12, at 723–24 (“Law enforcement’s primary professional 
commitment is to public safety, which may lead to the desire to get dangerous criminals off 
the street by any means possible.”).  See generally GARRETT, supra note 4, at 49–50 (providing 
that in cases where individuals were wrongly convicted, police may have genuinely 
believed they had the guilty party, but may have unintentionally utilized an unreliable 
procedure because of inadequate training, loose standards, and little accountability from 
judges); Olson, supra note 22, at 74–75 (2002) (explaining that there are several factors that 
may prevent law enforcement from apprehending the perpetrator including: a strenuous 
workload, a skewed concept of innocence, pressure to solve cases, and poorly trained 
personnel). 
25 Olson, supra note 22, at 74.  Olson has served as the Chief of Police in Minneapolis 
since 1995 and describes the general mindset of his colleagues as follows:  “[G]uilt is guilt” 
and the offender either “did it” or “did not.”  Id.  Police officers do not see guilt and 
innocence as a matter of degree.  Id.  “The detective wants to know whether the suspect 
committed a criminal act or not.”  Id. 
26 See Kruse, supra note 12, at 723–24 (explaining that excluding an eyewitness 
identification may seem like a “loophole” in the system, which may force law enforcement 
officers to make a choice between excluding evidence relevant to the proceeding and 
admitting evidence that is not entirely reliable).  See generally Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. 
Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:  Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 
979, 985–86 (1997) (providing that during an interrogation police may employ ethically 
questionable tactics in an effort to gain a confession at the expense of observing lawful 
procedures). 
27 See Ogletree, supra note 22, at 1246 (explaining that the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to counsel; thus, defense attorneys need not worry about 
guilt or innocence).  See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 694 (1988) 
(holding that the Constitution requires that indigent defendants receive minimally effective 
counsel, but it need only fall “within [a] wide range of reasonable professional assistance” 
and that in order to have a guilty verdict overturned for reason of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); 
GARRETT, supra note 4, at 205 (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most 
frequently raised claims during postconviction proceedings, and 32% of these DNA 
exonerees (52 of 165 cases) asserted that their trial was unfair because their defense lawyer 
was inadequate.”); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1645 (2005) (“[T]he strategy of pursuing 
accuracy through adversarial processes--through well-equipped defense counsel in 
particular--has reached a political limit.  Broadly speaking, legislatures are interested in 
accurate criminal adjudication, but they do not view zealous defense attorneys as the best 
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lawyer tends to see criminal defendants in the context of “societal ills, 
understandable human weakness, and tragic cycles of harm,” which 
causes him to believe that justice does not always demand punishment 
for the law-breaker.28  Thus, preventing the conviction of the innocent 
and helping the guilty avoid punishment are equally noble moral 
imperatives.29  This worldview motivates the defense attorney to search 
tirelessly for any error on the part of law enforcement or the prosecutor 
in order to obtain a dismissal or acquittal for the client.30  Prosecutors, 
however, generally see the criminal justice system from a much different 
perspective.31 
Prosecutors are committed to observing procedural rules and 
exercising prosecutorial discretion in an effort to advance substantive 
justice.32  The prosecutor’s commitment to procedural compliance may 
                                                                                                             
way to achieve that goal.”); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal 
Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 458–82 (1999) (arguing that criminal defense work has its 
roots in Jewish and Christian teaching); Holly R. Stevens, Colleen E. Sheppard, Robert 
Spangenbeg, Aimee Wickman & Jon B. Gould., State, County and Local Expenditures for 
Indigent Defense Services Fiscal Year 2008, CENTER FOR JUST., LAW & SOC’Y at GEO. MASON U. 
1, 6–7 (2010), http://www.thecrimereport.org/system/storage/2/5c/a/1071/abareport_ 
indigentdefense.pdf (examining the inadequate amount of money that states and localities 
spend to provide defense counsel to indigent defendants, which inevitably results in 
ineffective defense counsel at trial). 
28 Kruse, supra note 12, at 724; see also Barbara Allen Babcock, The Duty to Defend, 114 
YALE L.J. 1489, 1517 (2005) (“[P]ublic defending [is] a sacred duty that requires a certain 
soul-set and selflessness that only a special class of people is capable of achieving:  a 
mindset that values freedom over justice any day.”); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk:  
Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 
895–96 (2008) (arguing that while the legal system claims to put the risk of error on the 
government, practically speaking the legal system puts the burden on the accused; 
moreover, this practice is inconsistent with the constitutional doctrine that innocence-
protection is of the utmost importance). 
29 See Ogletree, supra note 22, at 1246–50 (exploring the various justifications and 
motivations that motivate defense attorneys). 
30 See id. (discussing the tensions that criminal defense attorneys must struggle with as 
they pursue their client’s best interest).  See generally Brown, supra note 27, at 1601 (arguing 
that defense attorneys must represent criminal defendants with “fewer legal tools” than 
prosecutors). 
31 See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (examining the role and influence of the 
prosecutor in today’s adversarial system). 
32 See GARRETT, supra note 4, at 208 (asserting that the prosecutor plays an imperative 
role in cases involving eyewitness identifications because prosecutors present most of the 
evidence, call most of the witnesses, communicate with police, and have access to all of the 
evidence that is in police custody); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) 
(explaining that a prosecutor’s role is to ensure that “justice shall be done,” and not simply 
to increase his own reputation by securing convictions).  See generally Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (holding that judges may order a new trial for 
prosecutorial misconduct only in the most extreme cases in which the conduct, “so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”); 
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conflict with law enforcement’s interest in punishing law-breakers, 
because the prosecutor may choose to reduce or drop charges on the 
basis of the strength and admissibility of the evidence.33  A prosecutor 
has a higher duty to carefully exercise discretion because a defense 
attorney may figuratively fight to the death for the rights of his client 
regardless of guilt or innocence while the prosecutor should not move 
forward unless convinced the defendant is truly guilty.34  But, in 
practice, while defense attorneys attempt to exploit every procedural 
shortcoming of law enforcement and prosecutors, prosecutors are also 
                                                                                                             
Kathleen A. Ridolfi & Maurice Possley, Preventable Error:  A Report on Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in California, 1997–2009, VERITAS INITIATIVE (2010), http://law.scu.edu/ncip/ 
file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_online%20version.pdf (pointing out that 
prosecutors in California are rarely sanctioned or disciplined for misconduct, which does 
little to deter prosecutorial misconduct); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 91 (1991) 
(explaining that in closing statements prosecutors may nearly misrepresent facts to the jury 
because the procedural guidelines for prosecutors allow for them to make arguments about 
inferences to be drawn from the facts); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error 
Part 1: The Verdict:  Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., January 11, 1999, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1,0,479347.story (“The 
failure of prosecutors to obey the demands of justice--and the legal system’s failure to hold 
them accountable for it--leads to wrongful convictions. . . . It also fosters a corrosive 
distrust in a branch of government that America holds up as a standard to the world.”). 
33 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717, 736–38 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors and law enforcement have a tremendous 
amount of discretion at their disposal).  See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-
3.9(a) (2008) (“A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the 
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to 
support a conviction.”); Zacharias, supra note 32, at 59 (noting that prosecutors have at their 
disposal the state’s resources, as well as close relationships with the police and grand jury). 
34 See Zacharias, supra note 32, at 64 (explaining that, because of her power and prestige, 
a prosecutor must commit herself to the fairness of the adversarial system by not taking 
advantage of its shortcomings); see also Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that while a prosecutor 
“may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones” or use “improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in 
an Adversary System, 1992 BYU. L. REV. 669, 680–81 (1992) (arguing that the “probable 
cause” standard is in reality a “heightened suspicion” standard, which does little protect 
those who are not guilty); Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 509–12 
(2000) (illustrating the lengths that a criminal defense attorney will go to protect her client).  
The author concludes by saying: 
The best criminal defense lawyers have some sense of what the truth 
is, but are not hamstrung by it.  Good criminal trial lawyers know how 
to use various aspects of the truth in order to construct a compelling 
narrative—one that jurors will accept, or one that will at least raise 
reasonable doubt.  But, generally, criminal defense lawyers cannot and 
must not spend much time or energy worrying about the truth.  After 
all, most criminal defendants are not innocent, and the truth is usually 
not helpful to the defense. 
Id. at 511. 
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tempted to secure a conviction utilizing whatever means possible 
regardless of guilt or innocence.35  An identification’s admissibility may 
be influenced by the various parties involved, but its reliability may be 
affected by the three stages of memory.36 
2. Variables in the Three Stages of Memory 
As counterintuitive as it may seem, memory is not an infallible 
recording device.37  On the contrary, scientific studies from the past 
thirty-four years show that multiple factors affect a person’s ability to 
reconstruct and recall a past event.38  Researchers divide the memory 
process into three distinct stages:  (1) the process of perceiving, (2) 
retaining, and (3) retrieving a particular event.39  As the event is taking 
place, a witness is in the process of consciously or subconsciously 
collecting information, which is known as the perception stage.40  During 
the retention stage, the witness will file away or store this initial 
perception until he or she attempts to recall the information.41  This 
                                                 
35 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395–401 (1992) 
(explaining that prosecutors have an expanding role in today’s criminal system, which 
allows a prosecutor to employ intrusive undercover tactics, aggressive grand jury 
interaction, and an increased power to bring charges); see also GARRETT, supra note 4, at 209 
(arguing that prosecutorial misconduct is extremely difficult to prove because courts rarely 
recommend sanctions and are reluctant to “call out prosecutors on misconduct or ethical 
lapses”); Melilli, supra note 34, at 682–83 (noting that disciplinary rules do little to deter 
misconduct because the judiciary rarely disciplines prosecutors for violating them). 
36 See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (describing the three stages of memory). 
37 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2-2, 12 (4th ed. 
2007) (“[W]e do not simply record [events] in our memory as a videotape recorder would.  
The situation is much more complex.”); see also Loftus et al., supra note 3, at 4–5 (discussing 
the various factors that influence a witness’s memory of a particular event). 
38 See Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-5, 19–20 (citing a study in which the participants were 
shown a thirty second simulated bank robbery and then asked to estimate how long it 
lasted and only a very small percentage of the participants guessed the amount of time 
correctly). 
39 See Derek Simmonsen, Teach Your Jurors Well:  Using Jury Instructions to Educate Jurors 
About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. REV. 1044, 1049 (2011) 
(suggesting that the average person does not understand the fundamentals of how memory 
works); Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 12–13 (showing how each of these three stages of 
memory may be affected by different variables). 
40 See Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1049 (explaining that at this stage the eyewitness 
may be affected by variables that are part of the event itself and variables that exist 
subconsciously in the eyewitness); see also Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 12–15 (labeling this 
the “acquisition” stage). 
41 See Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 13 & § 3-2(a), 53–54 (noting that how an eyewitness 
remembers an event is affected by the normal process of forgetting and by subsequent 
interactions with third parties); Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1051 (“Receiving new 
information after an event can change how a person later remembers that event.”).  
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remembering is known as the retrieval stage.42  Various dangers 
accompany each stage, threatening to pollute the elusive “perfect” 
memory.43 
The facts surrounding the event (“event factors”) affect the witness’s 
perception of the event.44  The physical proximity of the witness to the 
event, the lighting conditions, and the duration of the event are relevant 
factors in an identification analysis.45  The degree of stress and the level 
of violence also affect the ability of a witness to make a reliable 
identification.46  Closely connected to stress and violence is the presence 
of a weapon, which can muddle the perception of an eyewitness.47  In 
addition to the event factors, every individual has intrinsic traits, which 
may also affect his or her perception.48 
Certain characteristics inherent in the witness or the suspect tend to 
make identifications more or less reliable (“witness factors”).49  Perhaps 
                                                 
42 See Scott Woller, Note, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of 
Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 341–45 (2004) (providing 
an outline of factors that may influence a memory during the retrieval stage). 
43 See id.  (discussing the dangers that accompany a memory during each stage); see also 
Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1051 (“[T]he concept of memory involves multiple stages and 
a myriad of factors that can influence how a person perceives and remembers events.”). 
44 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656 (exploring how the various event factors affect the 
eyewitness’s perception of events); Woller, supra note 42, at 341 (“Event factors are factors 
inherent in an event itself.”). 
45 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656 (explaining that identification becomes increasingly 
difficult with greater distance and poor lighting).  See generally Suzannah B. Gambell, 
Comment, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors:  Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness 
Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 197 (2006) (arguing that the accuracy of an eyewitness 
identification increases in proportion to the amount of time the witness had to view the 
event). 
46 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining that violence and high levels of stress 
narrow a witness’s attention and trigger defense mechanisms, which allows an individual 
to confront the threatening situation; however, this reaction can impair a witness’s ability 
to accurately identify the perpetrator and hinder the witness from recalling relevant details 
about the crime); see also Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification:  A 
New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1995) (indicating that the 
common perception of stress among lay people is that it enhances an impression left upon 
an eyewitness; however, a witness in an extremely stressful situation is more likely to 
misidentify a suspect). 
47 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining the phenomenon known as “weapon 
focus,” in which a weapon draws a witness’s attention away from the face of the 
perpetrator and toward the weapon itself, making it more difficult for a witness to make a 
positive identification or describe the perpetrator at a later date). 
48 See infra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (discussing the probable effect of the 
various witness factors on an eyewitness identification). 
49 Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656–57 (providing a thorough list of witness factors that 
affect perception, paying particularly close attention to the effect of violence on the 
eyewitness); see also Woller, supra note 42, at 342 (“Witness factors, on the other hand, are 
factors that are inherent in the witness herself.”). 
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the most obvious witness factors involve visual defects pertaining to the 
witness’s eyesight, including age, darkness adaptation, depth perception, 
and color blindness.50  Also, a witness is more likely to accurately 
identify a suspect whose face contains some distinguishing feature.51  
Furthermore, the elderly and very young produce mistaken 
identifications at a much higher rate than other adults.52  However, an 
eyewitness’s perception or acquisition may also be influenced by cultural 
and personal features.53 
Various cultural and personal characteristics influence how a 
witness perceives sensory data in the perception phase of memory.54  The 
cliché, “they all look alike,” is at least partially true when it comes to 
cross racial identifications.55  Scientific studies have shown that an 
eyewitness is more likely to accurately identify someone of the same race 
than someone of another race.56  Additionally, juries tend to believe the 
                                                 
50 See LAWRENCE TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, §§ 1, 2-1 (1982) (pointing out the 
obvious problems these disabilities create); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 198 (“The 
witness’s line of sight and the amount of lighting should also be considered.”).  See generally 
Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of 
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (mentioning alcohol and drug 
intoxication as other factors that affect an eyewitness’s memory). 
51 See TerBeek, supra note 11, at 24 (explaining that unusual faces make an accurate 
identification much more likely). 
52 Id. at 24.  See generally State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994) (“[T]he use of 
coercive or highly suggestive interrogation techniques can create a significant risk that the 
interrogation itself will distort the child’s recollection of events, thereby undermining the 
reliability of the statements and subsequent testimony concerning such events.”); Stephen J. 
Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children:  Scientific Research and Legal 
Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 34 (2000) (suggesting that children should still be 
permitted to testify and recommends that in some circumstances judges allow experts to 
speak on the suggestibility of children); Michael R. Keenan, Child Witnesses:  Implications of 
Contemporary Suggestibility Research in a Changing Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 
100, 101 (2007) (explaining that children are much more susceptible to leading questions 
than adults although they are reliable witnesses when answering open-ended questions). 
53 See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing the various dangers involved 
when an eyewitness identifies a person of another race). 
54 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 657 (explaining how cultural bias, personal prejudice, and 
prior experiences influence an individual’s perception). 
55 See TerBeek, supra note 11, at 26–27 (suggesting this “other-race effect” has been 
proved with such certainty that it should be considered a fact); Bethany Shelton, Comment, 
Turning a Blind Eye to Justice:  Kansas Courts Must Integrate Scientific Research Regarding 
Eyewitness Testimony into the Courtroom, 56 KAN. L. REV. 949, 951–52 (2008) (showing that 
identifying someone of another race is more difficult than identifying someone of your 
own race). 
56 See GARRETT, supra note 4, at 73 (articulating the racial disparity among exoneree 
cases).  Of those who were exonerated by DNA evidence, Garrett found that white women 
misidentified black men in 71 out of 93 cases involving a cross-racial identification.  Id.  In 
addition, race may be a factor in a criminal case because prosecutors tend to increase the 
charges leveled against a black defendant when the victim is white because evidence 
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testimony of a confident eyewitness even though studies show that 
confidence has little correlation with accuracy.57  Prosecutors and 
defense attorneys alike know that there is no more powerful piece of 
evidence than a witness who stands before the jury and points a finger at 
who he or she believes is the perpetrator.58  An eyewitness’s confidence 
may be inflated or deflated depending on his or her exposure to outside 
influences and post identification feedback.59  Even if a memory is not 
distorted by event and witness factors in the perception phase, it remains 
susceptible to distortion in the retention stage.60 
                                                                                                             
suggests that white jurors may be harsher on black defendants when the victim is white.  
Id.  Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification:  
What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 232–38 (2001) (offering studies to 
show that the risk of misidentification is higher when trying to identify someone of a 
different race).  See generally Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Sex Offenses and Offenders, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. 1, 11 (1997), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF (showing that 
the victim and attacker are of the same race in 88% of rape cases and determining that rape 
victims are almost evenly divided among blacks and whites); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW 4, 8–9 (2010).  The author argues that incarceration of people of color in 
America operates in much the same way as Jim Crow laws during the Civil Rights 
Movement.  Id. at 4.  Two million people are held in prisons and jails in America today and 
“[o]ne in three young African American men is currently under the control of the criminal 
justice system—in prison, in jail, on probation, or on parole.”  Id. at 8–9.  The author notes 
that, once released, incarcerated individuals are “confined to the margins of mainstream 
society and denied access to the mainstream economy.  They are legally denied the ability 
to obtain employment, housing, and public benefits—much as African Americans were 
once forced into a segregated second-class citizenship in the Jim Crow era.”  Id. at 4.  See 
generally Estella Baker, From“Making Bad People Worse” to “Prison Works”:  Sentencing Policy 
In England And Wales in the 1990s, 7 CRIM. L.F. 639 (1996) (illustrating that incarceration 
creates additional problems in our society). 
57 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 202 (describing various influences that affect a witness’s 
confidence); see also GARRETT, supra note 4, at 49 (suggesting that eyewitness confidence is 
often created by events that occurred prior to trial).  In 92 out of 161 trial transcripts 
obtained from the trials of exonerated individuals the eyewitnesses admitted that they 
were not absolutely certain they had the right man when they made the initial 
identification.  Id. at 49. 
58 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Gambell, 
supra note 45, at 202 (suggesting that prosecutors and defense attorneys may also be misled 
by a confident eyewitness). 
59 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 658–59 (explaining how post-event information from the 
police, media, or other witnesses may have an extremely influential effect on witnesses 
during the retention phase); Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 246 (1996) (“Post-
event exposure to newly released information can dramatically affect the memory of the 
original event. . . . When witnesses later learn new information which conflicts with the 
original input, many will compromise between what they saw and what they were told 
later on.”); Fradella, supra note 50, at 10 (asserting that discussions with third parties are 
more likely to negatively influence a memory than the mere passage of time). 
60 See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (describing the retention stage and the 
factors that may affect a memory during this stage). 
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After the initial perception and acquisition of the information, the 
witness will then commit the information to memory, which is known as 
the retention stage.61  During this stage, the amount of information the 
witness processed and the retention interval are two factors that may 
lead to an inaccurate identification.62  Thus, a witness who retrieves a 
large amount of data after an extended period of time will probably be 
less reliable than a witness who recalls a small amount of information 
after a brief period of time.63  Although a memory may be unscathed 
through the first two phases, it must then pass through the retrieval 
phase before an eyewitness may testify accurately.64 
In addition to the dangers inherent in the perception and retention 
phases, a phenomenon known as “unconscious transference” may 
threaten the accuracy of an identification during the retrieval phase.65  
This occurs when a witness mistakenly combines or confuses two similar 
memories and mistakenly identifies a person from an unrelated memory 
as the person at the scene of the crime, resulting in a misidentification.66  
Event and witness factors may influence a witness’s memory, but 
interactions with third parties, including law enforcement, may also 
affect identifications.67 
                                                 
61 Sheehan, supra note 3, at 657–58 (“The accuracy of an identification can also be 
negatively impacted during the retention and retrieval phases of memory.”).  See generally 
Fradella, supra note 50, at 7–8 (discussing the effect of the passage of time, amount of data 
to be retained, and post-event information on this stage of memory). 
62 Fradella, supra note 50, at 7–8; see also Cohen, supra note 59, at 246 (explaining that the 
amount of time between acquisition and retrieval is a significant factor in the quality of a 
memory). 
63 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 657–58. 
64 See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing unconscious transference and 
its effects on a subsequent identification). 
65 See Francis A. Gilligan, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Theory of 
“Unconscious Transference”:  The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of 
Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L. REV. 107, 111–14 (1996) (providing a detailed description 
of the various factors that contribute to the occurrence of unconscious transference); see also 
Sean S. Hunt, The Admissibility of Eyewitness-Identification Expert Testimony in Oklahoma, 63 
OKLA. L. REV. 511, 520 (2011) (“The witness’s brain unconsciously superimposes memories 
on top of each other, usually at the expense of memorial accuracy.”). 
66 See Hunt, supra note 65, at 520 (stating that even confident eyewitnesses may confuse 
memories because of unconscious transference). 
67 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text (outlining commonly used police 
procedures and their effect on an identification). 
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3. Variables in the System & Police Procedure 
Police officers have the challenging task of balancing administrative 
efficiency and procedural fairness in a society rampant with crime.68  
Police procedure in line-ups may intentionally or unintentionally affect 
the reliability of an identification.69  Although different jurisdictions have 
taken precautionary steps to ensure more reliable line-up procedures, 
three types of bias remain prevalent within the system:  (1) foil bias, 
(2) instruction bias, and (3) presentation bias.70 
Foil bias may arise when a line-up is organized so that the suspect 
physically stands out from the other “fillers” in some way.71  
                                                 
68 See ALEXANDER, supra note 56, at 8–9 (stating that our nation’s jails and prisons held 
less than 350,000 people in 1972 compared to over two million today). 
69 Melissa B. Russano, Jason J. Dickinson, Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera., 
“Why Don’t You Take Another Look at Number Three?”:  Investigator Knowledge and Its Effects 
on Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Decisions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
355, 358–59; see Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence:  Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 
344 (1997) (arguing that even judges and attorneys are not fully aware of the effect of 
certain factors on memory); see also Amy Bradfield Douglass, Caroline Smith & Rebecca 
Fraser-Thill, A Problem with Double-Blind Photospread Procedures:  Photospread Administrators 
Use One Eyewitness’s Confidence to Influence the Identification of Another Witness, 29 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 543, 543–62 (2005) (showing that one witness’s memory may be influenced 
when exposed to the identification of another witness). 
70 Sheehan, supra note 3, at 659.  See generally Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells & 
Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between 
Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002); Ryan 
M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects on Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness 
Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106–07 (2004); R.C.L. Lindsay, Joanna 
D. Pozzulo, Wendy Craig, Kang Lee & Samantha Corber, Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential 
Lineups, and Showups:  Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 391, 402 (1997); Mark R. Phillips, Bradley D. McAuliff, Margaret Bull Kovera 
& Brian L. Cutler, Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as a Safeguard Against Investigator 
Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 941 (1999); Carolyn Semmler, Neil Brewer & Gary L. 
Wells, Effects of Postidentification Feedback on Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification 
Confidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 342–43 (2004); Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., 
Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy:  A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in 
Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. 
Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”:  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of 
the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED SCI. 360, 360 (1998). 
71 See Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence:  A 
Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 258–59 (2000) (explaining that eyewitnesses 
sometimes choose the person in the lineup that most resembles the perpetrator even when 
the suspect is not in the line-up); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification:  
Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 771 (1995) 
(discussing how an innocent suspect is much more likely to be chosen in a line-up if the 
individual matches the eyewitness’s description, but the other fillers do not); Loftus, supra 
note 37, at § 4–9 (explaining that a filler is an individual in the line-up who is known to be 
innocent and that the most reliable identifications occur when the suspect does not stand 
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Conspicuous characteristics include:  age, race, clothing, height and 
weight, hair style, facial hair, tattoos, and any other distinguishing 
features.72  If the witness correctly identifies the suspect in a line-up of 
physically similar individuals, then the risk of misidentification is 
lessened.73  But even if the line-up is organized properly, an officer may 
skew the results by offering feedback to the witness during the 
procedure.74 
Instruction bias occurs when the administering officer intentionally 
or unintentionally offers feedback to the witness.75  The risk of bias is 
reduced substantially when the officer, before the witness views the line-
up, informs the witness that the suspect may or may not be present in 
the line-up.76  The officer should be very conscious of his or her body 
language to avoid sending any confirmatory signals and behave as 
objectively as possible even if the witness makes a positive 
identification.77  A practice known as “blind administration” practically 
                                                                                                             
out from the other fillers because this type of procedure is the best test of the eyewitness’s 
memory). 
72 Gambell, supra note 45, at 196. 
73 See id. at 193, 195–96 (citing unreliable police procedures as one of the reasons for 
misidentifications); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(5) (2008) (requiring that the 
suspect shall “not unduly stand out from the fillers” and that the fillers “shall resemble, as 
much as practicable, the eyewitness’s description of the perpetrator in significant features, 
including any unique or unusual features”). 
74 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which an officer 
may influence an eyewitness). 
75 See Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909, 916 (1995) (suggesting that instruction bias also occurs if the 
administering officer fails to tell the eyewitness that the perpetrator may or may not be 
present in the line-up); Wells & Seelau, supra note 71, at 769 (explaining that some 
eyewitnesses approach a line-up assuming that the perpetrator is definitely among those 
individuals in the line-up and asserting that it is the administrator’s duty to inform the 
eyewitness that the perpetrator may or may not be present); see also § 15A-284.52(3) 
(requiring law enforcement to instruct eyewitnesses, “[t]he perpetrator might or might not 
be presented in the lineup,” and that “[i]t is as important to exclude innocent persons as it 
is to identify the perpetrator”); Lisa K. Rozzano, The Use of Hypnosis in Criminal Trials:  The 
Black Letter of the Black Art, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 645 (1987) (explaining that some 
jurisdictions admit identifications that occurred after the police hypnotized the witness 
even though hypnotism has not been linked with an increase in accuracy and may even 
cause the witness to be more susceptible to suggestion). 
76 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 660 (explaining that knowledge that the suspect may not 
be present helps ensure that the witness accurately identifies the perpetrator instead of 
choosing the individual who most closely resembles the suspect relative to the others in the 
lineup); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE:  A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 32 (2003) [hereinafter MANUAL] (“Fair composition of a lineup enables the 
witness to provide a more accurate identification or nonidentification. . . .  The investigator 
should compose the lineup in such a manner that the suspect does not unduly stand out.”). 
77 See MANUAL, supra note 76, at 42–43 (“The identification procedure should be 
conducted in a manner that promotes the reliability, fairness, and objectivity of the 
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eliminates the risk of instruction bias because the administering officer is 
not informed which individual is the suspect.78  However, the most 
damning form of bias occurs in a show-up identification.79 
Law enforcement may present the suspect to the witness in an 
inherently suggestive manner giving rise to presentation bias.80  Perhaps 
the most controversial method is referred to as a show-up 
identification.81  In a show-up, the police bring the suspected perpetrator 
before the witness and ask the witness to make an identification.82 
                                                                                                             
witness’s identification.”).  See generally Deah S. Quinlivan, Jeffery S. Neuschatz, Angelina 
Jimenez, Andrew D. Cling, Amy Bradfield Douglass & Charles A. Goodsell, Do 
Prophylactics Prevent Inflation?  Post-Identification Feedback and the Effectiveness of Procedures to 
Protect Against Confidence-Inflation in Earwitnesses, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 111, 112 (2009) 
(indicating that more research needs to be done in order to determine whether suggestive 
procedures affect voice lineups in the same manner as eyewitness lineups). 
78 See Fradella, supra note 50, at 17 (referring to this as a “double-blind” procedure); 
Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evidence:  How Well are Witnesses and Police 
Performing?, 18 CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 45 (explaining that blind administration reduces 
the risk of error when an eyewitness has a poor memory of the perpetrator); Wells & 
Seelau, supra note 71, at 775–76 (suggesting that agents and officers who are closely 
involved in a case should not administer line-ups); Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (listing 
jurisdictions who have adopted sequential double blind procedures:  New Jersey; North 
Carolina; Boston, Mass.; Northamptom, Mass.; Madison, Wisc.; Winston-Salem, N.C.; 
Hennepin, Minn.; Ramsey-County, Minn.; Santa Clara County, Calif.; and Virginia Beach, 
Virginia); see also § 15A-284.52(b)(1) (requiring that an “[i]ndependent administrator” 
oversee the line-up); Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell 
Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications:  Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup 
Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381, 405–10 (2006) (offering suggestions 
for law enforcement when implementing blind administration). 
79 See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (describing the process law enforcement 
follows when administering a show-up identification). 
80 Sheehan, supra note 3, at 661; see also Ryann M. Haw, Jason J. Dickinson & Christian A. 
Meissner, The Phenomenology of Carryover Effects Between Show-up and Line-up Identification, 
15 MEMORY 117, 118 (2007) (stating that when a witness participates in multiple lineup 
procedures, such as a photo array and subsequent live line up, the eyewitness is more 
likely to make an erroneous identification). 
81 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 193–94 (identifying the rare circumstances when a show-
up may be necessary but explaining that most courts view show-ups as presumptively 
suggestive); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 133–34 (1977) (holding that show-up 
identifications “give no assurance that the witness can identify the criminal from among a 
number of persons of similar appearance [which is] surely the strongest evidence that there 
was no misidentification”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (“The practice of 
showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a 
lineup, has been widely condemned.”); Bibbins v. Baton Rouge, 489 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570 
(M.D. La. 2007) (“An impermissibly suggestive identification . . . has a ‘permanency’ effect 
to it in the sense that the eyewitness can never get back to the original, pre-tainted 
memory.”). 
82 Gambell, supra note 45, at 193. 
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The most widely accepted police practice, a simultaneous line-up, is 
to present the suspect in a line-up with other fillers.83  But in this 
procedure, even if the police do not intentionally influence a lineup 
procedure, there is still the risk that the witness will identify the 
individual that most closely resembles the perpetrator.84  Even assuming 
that law enforcement utilized the best practices available, jurors are 
generally unequipped to effectively evaluate a witness’s testimony about 
an identification.85 
4. Lack of Juror Understanding of These Variables 
Unfortunately, most jurors are not aware of these variables and are 
more likely to believe the testimony of an eyewitness instead of more 
reliable evidence.86  In reality, eyewitness testimony is probably the most 
compelling piece of evidence in the eyes of a juror even though it is one 
of the least reliable.87  Thus, courts have traditionally used two types of 
                                                 
83 See Judges, supra note 71, at 254 (describing both live and photo array line-up 
identifications as necessities of police procedure); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 194–95 
(comparing simultaneous lineups with sequential line-ups, where the police show the 
witness potential suspects one at a time in order to force the witness to compare the person 
he is viewing with his memory and not with the other individuals in a line-up). 
84 Judges, supra note 71, at 255–56.  Relative judgment occurs when “the witness 
consciously compares various features of the members of the array and selects the 
individual who most closely resembles the witness’s mental representation of the 
perpetrator.”  Id. at 255.  See Wells & Seelau, supra note 71, at 768 (explaining that relative 
judgment occurs when the eyewitness chooses the individual in the line-up who most 
resembles her memory of the perpetrator in comparison with the other members of the 
line-up). 
85 See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (discussing the average juror’s ability to 
evaluate eyewitness testimony). 
86 See Loftus, supra note 3, at 2 (contending that courts often fail to provide jurors with 
the necessary information that would enable them to make an informed decision); see also 
Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Jasmina Besirevic, Solomon M. Fulero & Bella Jimenez-Lorente, 
The Effects of Pre-trial Publicity on Juror Verdicts:  A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 219, 220 (1999) (discussing whether juries are more likely to convict when there has 
been pre-trial publicity); see also Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott 
& G. Thomas Munsterman, Are Hung Juries a Problem?, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. 1, 50 
(2002), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblem 
Pub.pdf (discussing the amount of weight that jurors give to police, co-defendants, 
eyewitnesses, informants, defendants, and experts). 
87 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352–53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging that jurors are strongly affected by the testimony of an eyewitness); see also 
Devenport et al., supra note 69, at 346–47 (discussing psychological studies that explore 
juror sensitivity to various factors).  The studies conclude that the majority of survey 
participants are sensitive to the effect of a cross-racial identification and exposure to a prior 
photo-array, but most participants were not conscious of the effects of age and retention 
interval.  Id. 
Zerkle: I Never Forget a Face:  New Jersey Sets the Standard in Eyewitnes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
374 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
safeguards to educate jurors on the dangers of eyewitness identification:  
expert testimony and jury instructions.88 
Psychological experts have the skills needed to explain and clarify 
characteristics of memory that are counterintuitive and that most jurors 
would not otherwise be able to understand.89  In addition, an expert may 
be able to provide a framework for the average juror, ensuring that the 
juror has all the requisite tools to evaluate the merits of an 
identification.90  However, courts have failed to create a consistent 
criteria to determine whether an expert should be permitted to testify in 
a particular case.91  Specifically, judges who oppose expert testimony feel 
that it invades the decision-making authority of the juror to determine 
                                                 
88 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 664–65, 674 (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of admitting expert testimony and suggesting that jury instructions are the 
most effective way to educate jurors); see also Tanja Rapus Benton, Stephanie A. McDonnell, 
Neil Thomas, David F. Ross & Nicholas Honerkamp, On the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification:  A Legal and Scientific Evaluation, 2 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 
392, 404–05 (2006) (noting that ninety-eight percent of states take a discretionary approach 
when deciding whether to admit an eyewitness expert and discussing each state’s rationale 
for taking a specific approach); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of 
Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 173–74 (1990) (arguing that the jury system 
is vital to a democratic society because the jury represents the community and speaks for 
the community as a whole). 
89 See Hunt, supra note 65, at 513 (describing the role of the expert in a jury trial and 
explaining the potential value of permitting experts to educate jurors); Richard S. 
Schmechel, Timothy P. O’Toole, Catherine Easterly & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Beyond the Ken?  
Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 180 
(2006) (“Typically, eyewitness [identification] experts are prepared to testify in court about 
the extent to which the research literature explains how a particular factor, considered 
alone or in combination with others, likely would affect the reliability of an 
identification.”). 
90 See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert:  Reflections of a 
Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 889–91 (2005) (discussing the benefits of allowing an expert 
to testify at trial and concluding that courts often preclude expert testimony at trial because 
expert testimony “is unnecessary because an unassisted jury is perfectly capable of 
weighing the weaknesses of eyewitness testimony after cross-examination by defense 
counsel”); Fradella, supra note 50, at 24–25 (arguing that jury instructions are inadequate to 
educate jurors on the complexities involved in eyewitness identification and providing 
numerous reasons why expert testimony is the best method to accomplish the goal of 
educating the jury). 
91 See Cutler & Kovera, supra note 3, at 10–14 (indicating that recent DNA exonerations 
have caused many judges to become more favorable towards expert testimony on 
eyewitness identifications and mistaken identifications); Fradella, supra note 50, at 21–22 
(discussing the inability of courts to agree on whether experts should be allowed to testify 
about the complexities of eyewitness identification.  But see Paul C. Gianelli, Ake v. 
Oklahoma:  The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1305, 1307 (2004) (contending that expert testimony favors the wealthy because 
indigent defendants cannot afford to hire an expert). 
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whether a witness is believable.92  Thus, judges who oppose the use of 
experts may use jury instructions to inform jurors on the science of 
memory.93 
Jury instructions are generally permitted to educate jurors on the 
dangers of eyewitness identification.94  Most courts acknowledge that 
jurors simply do not have an adequate understanding of how memory 
works to make an informed decision and feel more comfortable with an 
instruction than with an expert.95  Jury instructions are also an 
inexpensive and efficient way to address the dangers of eyewitness 
identification.96  Opponents argue that judges decrease the credibility of 
an eyewitness in the eyes of the jury by giving an instruction on only this 
type of testimony.97  The Supreme Court’s struggle to account for the 
                                                 
92 Fradella, supra note 50, at 21; see also United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“[I]n reviewing the use of expert testimony, we . . . look to see if it will usurp 
either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of 
the jury in applying that law to the facts before it.”) (quoting United States v. Duncan, 42 
F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Hall, 165 
F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he credibility of eyewitness testimony is generally not 
an appropriate subject matter for expert testimony because it influences a critical function 
of the jury—determining the credibility of witnesses.”); Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That 
Couldn’t:  Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. 
REV. 727, 727–28 (2007) (asserting that many judges believe cross-examination is the best 
way to analyze whether an eyewitness identification is reliable and tracing this belief all the 
way back to mid-eighteenth century England). 
93 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing the strengths and weaknesses 
of allowing jury instructions instead of expert witnesses). 
94 See Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1058–61, 1076 (discussing the justice system’s gradual 
acceptance of eyewitness science and detailing the slow process that courts went through 
to determine whether to permit expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification); see 
also Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 729 n.7 (2012) (listing the various states’ 
versions of eyewitness identification jury instructions); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552, 558–559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (creating one of the most widely used pattern jury instructions 
for cases involving eyewitness identifications). 
95 Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1080; see also Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury 
Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000) (“Jurors cannot perform their duties without 
being instructed on the law they are to apply.”); Handberg, supra note 46, at 1061 (“[J]udges 
are already in the habit of giving jury instructions, so they will find it easy to incorporate a 
new instruction.”). 
96 Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1081; see also Handberg, supra note 46, at 1060–61 (calling 
jury instructions a “low cost solution” because they may be administered with relative ease 
at the conclusion of a trial and suggesting that the judge is the best party to deliver 
guidelines on eyewitness identification to the jury because “the judge is nonpartisan and 
his task is to help the jury perform its function [and] the jury intuitively looks to the judge 
for guidance as to how it is supposed to behave”). 
97 Sheehan, supra note 3, at 671; see also Conley v. State, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. 1980) 
(refusing to overturn the trial court for not permitting a jury instruction because the 
instruction contained comments on the evidence and concerned the weight of the 
eyewitness testimony); Waller v. State, 581 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating 
that a jury instruction singling out the eyewitness identification would be improper 
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complexities of eyewitness identification is illustrated in its reluctance to 
incorporate scientific data into its approach over the past thirty years.98 
B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence and New Jersey’s Decision 
Between 1967 and 1977, the Supreme Court established guidelines 
that continue to govern the admissibility of an eyewitness identification 
in most jurisdictions.99  In 2011, New Jersey became the first state to 
significantly depart from the standard created by the Supreme Court.100  
Part II.B.1 reviews the slowly evolving jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court, and Part II.B.2 examines New Jersey’s departure from the 
framework utilized by the Supreme Court.101 
1. Eyewitness Identification and the Supreme Court 
In United States v. Wade, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority and 
penned the oft quoted and perhaps prophetic line, “[t]he vagaries of 
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are 
rife with instances of mistaken identification.”102  In this case, after 
allegedly robbing a bank, two bank employees identified Wade in a line-
up without the presence of his lawyer, and Wade claimed that his Sixth 
Amendment rights had been violated.103  The Court held that a criminal 
defendant has the right to counsel at a post-indictment line-up because 
                                                                                                             
because it would concern the weight of the evidence); Handberg, supra note 46, at 1061 
(asserting that most jury instructions are unintelligible to most jurors because they are 
written to satisfy a legal standard and that “as the instructions become more legally 
sophisticated, they become less understandable to the average person”). 
98 See infra Part II.B (outlining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on eyewitness 
identification from the past thirty years). 
99 See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the 
Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 443 (2009) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has not added to its eyewitness identification jurisprudence since 
1977).  In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness 
evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule 
requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to 
assess its creditworthiness.”  Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 728 (2012).  A 
defendant has adequate protections against erroneous identifications including the right to 
counsel, compulsory process, cross-examination, trial by jury, the burden of proof, and jury 
instructions.  Id. at 728–29. 
100 See infra Part II.B.2 (summarizing New Jersey’s revised approach). 
101 See Part II.B (summarizing the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification 
jurisprudence and New Jersey’s recent departure from it). 
102 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).  Brennan also recognized that 
eyewitness evidence is “proverbially untrustworthy.”  Id. 
103 Id. at 220. 
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of the potential for suggestiveness in line-up procedures.104  Further, a 
pre-trial identification is inadmissible if the defendant was denied 
counsel.105  The Court also held that a subsequent in-court identification 
would not be suppressed if the prosecutor could show that the 
identification was based on an independent source.106 
In Stovall v. Denno, the perpetrator stabbed the victim eleven times, 
placing the victim in critical condition.107  Not knowing whether the 
victim would live, the police handcuffed the defendant and conducted a 
show-up identification in the hospital room.108  The victim positively 
identified the defendant, and the defendant argued that his due process 
rights had been violated by the suggestive manner of the show-up 
identification.109  The Court held that the show-up identification did not 
violate the defendant’s due process rights because the identification 
method was not “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification.”110  Thus, the Court created the 
“totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether the 
identification was unnecessarily suggestive.111 
After five years, the Supreme Court decided Neil v. Biggers and again 
weighed in on the identification discussion.112  In Biggers, a man 
threatened the victim in her kitchen with a butcher knife and eventually 
wrestled her to the ground.113  After the victim’s daughter began 
screaming, the perpetrator led the victim two blocks away into the 
woods and raped her.114  Seven months later after viewing numerous 
suspects, the police conducted a show-up identification, and the victim 
identified the defendant as the perpetrator.115  The Court held that the 
identification was admissible unless there was a substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.116  The Court resurrected and modified the two prong 
                                                 
104 Id. at 236–37.  The Wade Court noted the importance of pre-trial identifications, as 
eyewitnesses rarely change their mind or recant their former identification.  Id. at 229. 
105 Id. at 226.  
106 Id. at 239–40. 
107 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 295–96. 
110 Id. at 301–02. 
111 Id. at 302. 
112 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 189 (1972). 
113 Id. at 193–94.  The lights were off in her home and the entire confrontation took place 
at night.  Id. 
114 Id. at 194.  See generally Elizabeth Hampson, Sari M. van Anders & Lucy I. Mullin, A 
Female Advantage in the Recognition of Emotional Facial Expressions:  Test of an Evolutionary 
Hypothesis, 27 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27 (2006) (concluding that women are 
generally better at identifying emotional facial expressions than men). 
115 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 194–95. 
116 Id. at 198. 
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due process analysis created in Stovall and Wade.117  However, the Court 
distinguished itself from the Wade and Stovall courts by holding that the 
suggestibility of an identification will be weighed against its reliability; 
thus, the Court shifted its focus from suggestibility to reliability.118  The 
totality of the circumstances framework includes five factors:  (1) the 
witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of 
the crime, (2) the witness’ degree of attention, (3) the witness’s accuracy 
in describing the criminal, (4) the witness’s confidence in identifying the 
criminal, and (5) the amount of time between the crime and 
confrontation.119 
Today most courts follow some version of the standard established 
in Manson v. Brathwaite.120  In Manson, Glover approached and knocked 
on the door of a known drug dealer while working undercover.121  After 
opening the door twelve to eighteen inches, the man accepted cash from 
Glover, closed the door, and subsequently re-opened the door to deliver 
two glassine bags to Glover.122  Glover described the man to an officer at 
headquarters who retrieved a picture of the defendant.123  Glover 
identified the defendant as the man who had sold him drugs.124  The 
Court declared, “[r]eliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of an identification testimony. . . . ”125  Reiterating its 
holding in Biggers, the Court held that an unnecessarily suggestive 
eyewitness identification will not be excluded per se if the identification 
                                                 
117 Id. at 199. 
118 Id. at 198–99.  See generally State v. Orlando, 634 A.2d 1039, 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1993) (providing an example of a court utilizing the Manson approach). 
119 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; see also John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. 
Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence:  Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 
CT. REV. 12, 17 (1999) (arguing that opportunity to observe the criminal and the length 
between the crime and the identification are the only two of the Biggers factors that can be 
connected to the accuracy of an identification); Gambell, supra note 45, at 208–12 
(discussing the circuit split over how to interpret Manson and also surveying the various 
approaches state courts have taken to this issue); Wells & Bradfield, supra note 70, at 361–62 
(proving that suggestive police behavior may inflate witness confidence and that the 
witness’s memory of the event may be altered, including his view of the attacker and the 
degree of focus that the witness placed on the perpetrator). 
120 See generally Gambell, supra note 45, at 206–14 (discussing the Biggers test and the role 
it has played in the courts nationally); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. 
Brathwaite Revisited:  Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109 (2006) (arguing that Manson does not protect 
the Due Process rights of criminal defendants and suggesting a more effective approach) 
121 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 100–01 (1977). 
122 Id. at 100. 
123 Id. at 101. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 114. 
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is otherwise sufficiently reliable.126 The Court held that an 
identification’s reliability should be measured by weighing the Biggers 
factors against the suggestiveness of the procedure.127  Most states have 
adopted  some version of the test announced in Manson; however, New 
Jersey became the first state to significantly depart from the Supreme 
Court’s method in State v. Henderson.128 
2. Eyewitness Identification and New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
On August 24, 2011, New Jersey became the first state to reject the 
Manson test in favor of a more pro-defendant eyewitness identification 
framework.129  On January 1, 2003, Rodney Harper and James Womble 
ushered in the New Year by drinking champagne and wine and smoking 
crack cocaine at Womble’s girlfriend’s apartment.130  Sometime after 2:30 
a.m., George Clark and another man armed with a gun forcefully entered 
the apartment in search of $160 owed to Clark by Harper.131  Clark led 
Harper into another room while the unidentified man stood in a “small, 
narrow, dark hallway” and aimed the gun at Womble, telling him not to 
move.132  Womble heard a gunshot, found Harper severely injured, and 
volunteered to retrieve the money for Clark.133  Harper died from the 
gunshot wound nine days later.134 
Detective Louis Ruiz and Investigator Randall MacNair interviewed 
Womble the following day.135  Initially, Womble was uncooperative 
because he feared that the perpetrators would harm his elderly father, 
but he eventually made an identification after one of the officers told 
                                                 
126 Id.; see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 214–15 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
current approach makes it extremely difficult for an identification to be excluded because 
defense counsel must show that:  (1) the police utilized an “impermissibly suggestive” 
identification procedure, and; (2) even if it was suggestive the identification may still be 
admissible if the State can show the identification is reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances). 
127 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; see Gambell, supra note 45, at 206 (discussing policy reasons 
for adopting the totality of the circumstance test).  See generally Gary L. Wells & Dean S. 
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability 
Test in Light of Eyewitness Science:  30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009). 
128 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878–79 (N.J. 2011). 
129 Id. at 918. 
130 Id. at 879.  “Womble smoked two bags of crack cocaine with his girlfriend in the hours 
before the shooting; the two also consumed one bottle of champagne and one bottle of 
wine; the lighting was ‘pretty dark’ in the hallway where Womble and defendant 
interacted; defendant shoved Womble during the incident.”  Id. at 882. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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him, “[j]ust do what you have to do, and we’ll be out of here.”136  In a 
photographic array of eight pictures, Womble easily discounted five of 
the photos and eventually dismissed a sixth, but he struggled to choose 
from the remaining two photos.137  After considerable deliberation, 
Womble identified Henderson; however, Henderson argued that the 
witness mistakenly identified him as a result of suggestive procedures.138 
At the Wade pre-trial hearing, the trial court found that the 
identification was admissible in spite of any suggestibility because it was 
reliable under the totality of the circumstances, and there was no 
substantial likelihood of misidentification.139  The appellate division held 
that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive under 
the first prong of the Manson test and remanded for a new Wade 
hearing.140  The New Jersey Supreme Court evaluated the evidence 
proffered by the parties and amici and rejected the traditional Manson 
test in favor of an approach more consistent with the scientific 
evidence.141 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that courts should consider the 
following non-exhaustive list of system variables to determine whether 
an identification is unnecessarily suggestive:  (1) blind administration, 
(2) pre-identification instructions, (3) line-up construction, (4) feedback, 
(5) recording confidence, (6) multiple viewings, (7) show-ups, (8) private 
actors, and (9) other identifications.142  The New Jersey Court went on to 
explain that if a court finds evidence of suggestiveness in the system 
variables, it should then consider the following non-exhaustive list of 
estimator variables to determine whether an identification is reliable:  
(1) stress, (2) weapon focus, (3) duration, (4) distance and lighting, 
(5) witness characteristics, (6) characteristics of perpetrator, (7) memory 
decay, (8) race-bias, (9) opportunity to view the criminal at the time of 
the crime, (10) degree of attention, (11) accuracy of prior description of 
the criminal, (12) level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, 
and (13) the time between the crime and the confrontation.143  The 
defendant must proffer evidence that one of the identification 
                                                 
136 Id. at 879, 881.  “Womble did not recant his identification, but during the Wade hearing 
he testified that he felt as though Detective Weber was ‘nudging’ him to choose defendant's 
photo, and ‘that there was pressure’ to make a choice.”  Id. at 881. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 877. 
139 Id. at 882. 
140 Id. at 883–84.  At the new trial, the parties produced over 360 exhibits, including 200 
published scientific studies, and also called seven eyewitness identification expert 
witnesses and three law professors.  Id. at 884–85. 
141 Id. at 878–79, 918. 
142 Id. at 920–21. 
143 Id. at 921–22. 
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procedures in the system was suggestive in order to obtain a pre-trial 
hearing.144  A court may then evaluate both the system and estimator 
variables and determine whether the identification is admissible.145 
The topic of eyewitness identification presents significant and 
unique challenges to the judicial system because of the complexity of the 
variables that influence reliability.146  The problem only worsens when a 
jury is the arbiter of whether an identification is reliable.147  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has not incorporated reliable scientific data into its 
approach.148  Nonetheless, New Jersey’s departure from the Supreme 
Court’s Manson framework is a giant step in the right direction.149 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The legal system’s reluctance to incorporate thirty years of scientific 
research into its method of analyzing eyewitness identification has 
injured hundreds of criminal defendants and discredited the criminal 
justice system.150  Criminal defense attorneys have filed motion after 
motion, and researchers have conducted study after study, yet the 
current Manson framework has remained virtually unchanged.151  Recent 
DNA exonerations illustrate the failure of the Manson approach to ensure 
reliable identification procedures, deter improper police practices, and 
prepare a jury to make an informed decision.152  Although courts have 
utilized the Manson approach for over thirty years, New Jersey’s model 
incorporates reliable scientific research, deters suggestive police practices 
                                                 
144 Id. at 922. 
145 Id. 
146 See supra Part II.A.1–3 (discussing the variables that influence memory). 
147 See supra Part II.A.4 (considering the average juror’s ability to evaluate eyewitness 
identification). 
148 See supra Part II.B.1 (providing a brief history of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
eyewitness identification testimony). 
149 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing New Jersey’s departure from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence).  But see Massachusetts v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 209–10 (Mass. 2011) 
(declining to follow New Jersey’s approach when “the defendant did not move to suppress 
the identification and where the issue is whether the defendant’s attorney was ineffective 
in failing to do so”). 
150 See GARRETT, supra note 4, at 6–11 (reviewing the cases of 250 exonerated individuals 
and concluding that the overwhelming majority of those cases could have been prevented 
by amended procedures). 
151 See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 1-2 (advocating for a change in the Supreme 
Court’s approach to eyewitness identification). 
152 See NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 4, at 9 (explaining how the DNA exonerations from 
the past thirty years are our best reminder that the system is not working correctly); Wells 
& Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 1–2 (explaining that all of the exoneration cases had to pass 
through the Manson framework, providing evidence that Manson is not keeping out 
erroneous identifications). 
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without providing an unnecessary burden on law enforcement, and uses 
jury instructions to equip juries with the understanding necessary to 
properly evaluate the data.153  New Jersey’s model is not immune from 
criticism, but it is a step in the right direction and ultimately is in the best 
interest of law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.154 
First, Part III.A of this Note analyzes the weaknesses inherent in the 
Manson approach to evaluating eyewitness identification.155  Second, Part 
III.B evaluates New Jersey’s attempt to incorporate scientific data, deter 
suggestive police procedures, and address the limitations of jurors.156  
Last, Part III.C considers the overall effect of New Jersey’s approach on 
the criminal justice system as a whole.157 
A. Assessing the Adequacy of the Traditional Manson Approach to 
Eyewitness Identification 
Although Neil v. Biggers was decided in 1972, most studies on 
eyewitness identification were published after 1975.158  As a result, the 
five factors introduced in Biggers are largely under-inclusive and out of 
touch with scientific reality.159  Consequently, the Manson method of 
weighing the Biggers factors against the corrupting effect of a suggestive 
identification procedure fails to incorporate modern scientific findings 
into its analysis, deter suggestive police procedures, and provide juries 
with the information needed to make the best decision.160 
                                                 
153 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918–19 (N.J. 2011). 
154 See infra Part III.B (exploring the advantages and disadvantages to law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys). 
155 See infra Part III.A (arguing that scientific research has rendered the Manson 
framework inadequate and in need of revision). 
156 See infra Part III.B (explaining that New Jersey’s approach is the best attempt to 
address the scientific data). 
157 See infra Part III.C (suggesting that New Jersey’s method benefits everyone involved). 
158 See Gambell supra note 45, at 192 (suggesting that the large amount of research on 
memory has rendered several of the Biggers factors unreliable).  See generally supra note 119 
and accompanying text (explaining why three of the Biggers factors are no longer reliable). 
159 Gambell, supra note 45, at 220–21.  Two of the factors have since been verified by 
scientific data, but three have little correlation with accuracy.  Id.  For example, Biggers 
includes eyewitness confidence as a factor even though it has no bearing on the accuracy of 
an identification.  Id.  Eighty-seven percent of psychologists affirmed that they would 
testify in court that confidence does not indicate accuracy.  Id. 
160 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining that courts rarely find an 
identification procedure as unnecessarily suggestive).  See generally supra note 86 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that the average juror is not aware of the dangers 
accompanying eyewitness testimony). 
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1. Manson’s Test Fails to Deter Suggestive Police Practices and May 
Reward Suggestive Procedures 
Manson’s two prong test fails to deter improper police practices and 
may sometimes even reward suggestive police procedures.161  A court 
will not proceed to the reliability prong of the analysis until it decides 
that the police utilized a suggestive procedure; however, at this point the 
damage has been done because a suggestive procedure may have 
already influenced three of the five reliability factors.162  For example, 
confirmatory feedback received during the retention phase causes the 
witness to solidify that memory as confirmed by the outside influence; 
thus, the witness’s degree of certainty will increase in proportion to the 
suggestiveness of the procedure.163  Second, a witness’s opportunity to 
view the culprit may be distorted if the witness inaccurately perceives 
the amount of time the witness had to view the perpetrator or the 
distance the witness was away from the perpetrator or receives 
confirmatory feedback in the process.164  Third, a witness’s ability to 
recall his degree of attention during the commission of the crime may be 
distorted by suggestive procedures because “attention” is purely a 
subjective variable that may not be measured against other objective 
criteria.165 
The Court in Manson did not want to adopt a per se exclusionary rule 
that would exclude an identification altogether if the procedure was 
suggestive.166  Understandably, some identifications may still be reliable 
                                                 
161 See supra Part II.A.3 (outlining the most commonly used police procedures and 
indicating which variables have the potential to be influenced by suggestive procedures). 
162 See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 9 (suggesting that there is nothing inherently 
flawed in adopting a two prong test; however, the criteria upon which the two prongs rest 
lends itself to encouraging suggestive procedures). 
163 See Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1052–54 (stating that confidence should not be used 
in the analysis because there is no correlation between confidence and accuracy and citing 
specific studies showing that suggestive remarks confirming an initial identification makes 
witnesses more confident that their original identification was correct). 
164 See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 9–10 (discussing a phenomenon known as 
“visual hindsight illusion” that occurs when a viewer mistakenly assumes the identity of a 
person); see also Brigham, supra note 119, at 17 (suggesting that opportunity to observe the 
criminal, if not distorted by suggestive procedures, is one of the Biggers factors that can be 
connected to the accuracy of an identification). 
165 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining how violence and high levels of 
stress can narrow a witness’s attention and trigger defense mechanisms potentially 
impairing a witness’s ability to accurately identify the perpetrator and hinder the witness 
from recalling relevant details about the crime); see also Handberg, supra note 46, at 1023 
(asserting that jurors generally do not understand how stress and other objective factors 
influence a witness’s ability to make an accurate and reliable identification). 
166 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 214–15 (suggesting that a per se exclusionary rule would 
alleviate many of the potential dangers that defendants face from eyewitness identification 
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even though the procedure utilized was flawed.167  However, trial judges 
rarely exclude an identification because of suggestiveness, assuming that 
thorough cross-examination and the discernment of the jury will weed 
out any erroneous identifications.168  Thus, the totality of the 
circumstances test vests trial judges with the discretion to exclude or 
admit a suggestive identification but fails to offer clear guidelines for 
when an identification should be suppressed.169  Consequently, 
normative judicial practice provides little incentive for police to change 
their procedures because police misconduct is rarely cited as grounds to 
exclude an identification.170 
2. The Biggers Test, as Utilized by Manson, is Under-Inclusive and 
Neglects the Scientific Data 
Courts should consider the factors discussed in New Jersey’s 
decision in addition to the five factors established in Biggers because 
three of the Biggers factors rely on the witness’s self-reporting.171  
Currently, courts must rely mainly on the witness’s recollection or 
                                                                                                             
and comparing the failure to exclude suggestive identifications to “allowing a coerced or 
involuntary confession”). 
167 See State v. Orlando, 634 A.2d 1039, 1043–44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (offering 
an extreme example of an identification made by a kidnapped victim who viewed her 
perpetrator for six hours and her identification was deemed reliable even though the police 
utilized an unnecessarily suggestive procedure). 
168 See Epstein, supra note 92, at 727–29, 751 (providing that cross-examination is not 
necessarily the best way to analyze whether an eyewitness identification is reliable even 
though many judges believe it is the best method); Sheehan, supra note 3, at 665 
(concluding that cross examination and the jury serve the purpose of exposing a dishonest 
or biased witness, but these two safeguards are “ill equipped to confront an honest but 
mistaken witness who, because she is giving testimony she believes to be true, will not 
display the demeanor of someone who is lying”); see also Perry v. New Hamphire, 132 S.Ct. 
716, 721 (2012) (“When no improper law enforcement activity is involved . . . it suffices to 
test reliability through . . . the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous 
cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility 
of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). 
169 Gambell, supra note 45, at 215–16; see TerBeek, supra note 11, at 46, 51 (explaining that 
the Supreme Court’s lack of consistency has resulted in numerous cases where innocent 
people have been imprisoned and encouraging the Supreme Court to “reverse[] its stale 
eyewitness jurisprudence [so] that the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications can 
be fully remedied”). 
170 Kruse, supra note 12, at 670–71 (“A suggestive identification procedure thus becomes 
the source of the very factors that are used by a judge to test its reliability in the post hoc 
setting of a completed investigation, effectively insulating an unduly suggestive eyewitness 
identification from legal challenge.”). 
171 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918 (N.J. 2011); see Gambell, supra note 45, at 217 
(arguing that the Supreme Court did not intend for the Biggers factors to be an exhaustive 
list and that courts should be willing to consider other factors in their analysis). 
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impression of the event when evaluating the witness’s opportunity to 
view the perpetrator, degree of attention, and confidence.172  But in 
reality, the witness may or may not be aware of how the presence of 
other factors may distort memory; thus, a court is at the mercy of the 
witness’s self-reporting.173 
First, contrary to public opinion, the stress of a situation does not 
focus a witness’s attention on the face of the perpetrator thereby 
increasing its accuracy.174  A witness’s attention will be negatively 
affected by the overall stress level, the presence of a weapon, and the 
amount of violence.175  In these situations, an individual’s survival 
instincts focus his or her attention on self-preservation, which actually 
causes the witness to pay less attention to the perpetrator than the 
witness would without the presence of such factors.176  Second, a 
confident eyewitness is no more likely to be correct than a witness who is 
not confident.177  To say it another way, the scientific community agrees 
that an eyewitness’s confidence does not increase or decrease 
accuracy.178  Even though confidence is among the most unreliable 
factors, juries commonly believe a confident eyewitness even if it means 
ignoring hard scientific data.179  Third, a court should consider the 
witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator, but not to the exclusion of 
other relevant factors such as:  the proximity of the witness to the event, 
                                                 
172 See supra Part II.B.1 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s current approach to 
eyewitness identification). 
173 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896–900; see Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1048–49 (suggesting 
that most eyewitnesses and jurors do not understand the fundamentals of how memory 
works); Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 12–13 (showing how each of these three stages of 
memory may be affected by the presence of different factors). 
174 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining that high levels of stress inhibit an 
individual’s ability to confront a threatening situation); see also Handberg, supra note 46, at 
1023 (indicating that high amounts of stress are more likely to result in a misidentification). 
175 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656–57 (providing a thorough examination of the effect of 
violence of the eyewitness). 
176 See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of violence, stress, 
and weapon focus on an eyewitness); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (arguing 
that a weapon has a magnetic presence that draws a witness’s attention away from the face 
of the perpetrator and toward the weapon itself, making it more difficult for a witness to 
make a positive identification or describe the perpetrator at a later date). 
177 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (explaining that a confident eyewitness 
is not more reliable than a witness who is not as confident and suggesting that confidence 
may be affected by post-event information and interactions). 
178 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (illustrating how the scientific 
community is in agreement on this issue). 
179 See generally Survey, supra note 3, at 1–6, 11–12 (citing surveys showing what most 
jurors believe about eyewitness identification). 
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the lighting conditions, the duration of the event, any visual defects 
inherent in the witness, and the race of the witness and perpetrator.180 
3. Manson Does Not Account for Jurors’ Inability to Accurately Process 
Eyewitness Data 
Manson fails to adequately prepare a jury to make an informed 
decision.181  Because courts rarely exclude a suggestive procedure, most 
eyewitness evidence is presented to the jury despite its potentially 
adverse effects in determining whether the identification should be 
admissible.182  Unfortunately, the average juror will often believe an 
eyewitness even if the eyewitness is contradicted by more reliable 
evidence.183  Studies suggest that eyewitness evidence is the most 
compelling to the juror and that jurors are unaware of the implications of 
extrinsic evidence on the identification.184  Without jury instructions or 
expert testimony, jurors do not have the requisite knowledge to make an 
informed decision.185 
In conclusion, the Manson Court could not have known the 
implications of its decision before many of the scientific studies on 
memory and eyewitness identification were published thirty years 
ago.186  However, recent DNA exonerations and modern scientific data 
illustrate that the two prong Manson test generally fails to preclude 
wrongful police procedures, include relevant scientific research, and 
inform juries of factors to consider in making their decision.187  As a 
                                                 
180 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 218–19 (arguing that courts should not consider this 
factor in isolation because other estimator variables impact how a witness remembers his 
opportunity to view the suspect). 
181 See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text (exploring the general knowledge of 
jurors and discussing the benefits of both jury instructions and expert testimony). 
182 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging that jurors are strongly affected by the testimony of an eyewitness); 
Devenport et al., supra note 69, at 347–48 (suggesting that jurors will ignore more credible 
evidence in light of eyewitness testimony). 
183 Devenport et al., supra note 69, at 347–48. 
184 See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 664 (stating that eyewitness evidence is often the most 
compelling to the average juror notwithstanding the existence of contrary more reliable 
evidence). 
185 See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of jury instructions and expert testimony). 
186 See Gambell, supra note 45, at 217–18 (arguing that the Court did not intend for the 
Biggers factors to be an exhaustive list because it knew that science would change the way 
we understand memory). 
187 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011); see GARRETT, supra note 4, at 48 
(reviewing the cases of the 250 exonerated individuals and explaining that “suggestive 
identification procedures and unreliable identifications” were two recurring problems). 
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result, the New Jersey Supreme Court resolved to confront these 
weaknesses in its landmark decision State v. Henderson.188 
B. New Jersey’s Approach Addresses the Weaknesses Inherent in the Manson 
Framework 
On August 24, 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to 
resolve the weaknesses inherent in the Manson decision in State v. 
Henderson.189  To do so, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a new 
standard for assessing the reliability of an eyewitness identification.190  
The goal of this new test was to protect the rights of criminal defendants 
from police misconduct and uninformed jurors while allowing the 
prosecution to introduce relevant evidence at trial.191  This approach 
differs from Manson in two ways:  (1) the defendant must offer only some 
evidence of suggestiveness, triggered by a system variable, in order to 
receive a pre-trial hearing, at which time the judge will examine all 
relevant system and estimator variables; and (2) jury instructions should 
be crafted so that the jury can accurately evaluate identification 
evidence.192 
1. New Jersey’s Test Deters Suggestive Police Practices While 
Simultaneously Protecting the Interests of Law Enforcement and 
Prosecutors 
New Jersey’s approach protects defendants by deterring suggestive 
police procedures and protects the interests of law enforcement and 
prosecutors by avoiding bright line rules that suppress eyewitness 
identifications.193  New Jersey sought to deter police by providing for a 
                                                 
188 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918. 
189 Id. at 919. 
190 Id. at 878–79. 
191 Id. at 918–19. 
192 Id. at 919–20.  After the defendant has showed some evidence of suggestiveness, the 
State must offer proof showing that the identification is reliable.  Id. at 920.  Then, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”  Id.  After examining the relevant evidence, if the court decides that the 
defendant has carried his burden and demonstrated a “very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification,” the court should suppress the identification; if not, the court 
should craft appropriate jury instructions.  Id.  At any point, the court may abandon the 
hearing if it feels like the defendant’s claim is groundless.  Id. 
193 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112–13 (1977) (indicating that the Supreme 
Court wanted to avoid a per se exclusionary rule if an identification was procured with 
some suggestiveness); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922 (following the Supreme Court’s approach 
in Manson and avoiding a per se rule that would exclude an identification if the 
identification was accompanied by any suggestiveness).  The court reasoned that, 
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more probing investigation into certain procedures that are within the 
State’s control.194  Although suggestive procedures may continue to 
affect the same estimator variables, an analysis that includes the 
additional factors will make it unlikely that the identification will be 
corrupted by suggestiveness.195  Most estimator variables operate 
independently of the criminal justice system; thus, the reason for the 
distinction between system and estimator variables.196  For example, 
stress, weapon focus, duration, distance, lighting, witness characteristics, 
characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, and race-bias cannot be 
significantly altered by the intentional or unintentional actions of law 
enforcement.197 
Even if the defendant offers proof of suggestiveness, an 
identification will not be suppressed unless the defendant can show a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.198  Although 
judges continue to hold a large amount of discretion, the New Jersey 
approach provides judges with much clearer guidelines for when an 
identification should be excluded.199  Also, at a pre-trial Wade hearing, a 
court will give the prosecution an opportunity to show why the 
identification is reliable despite a showing of suggestiveness.200  By 
avoiding a per se exclusionary rule, prosecutors will have much less 
incentive to cover up the mistakes of law enforcement, and defense 
attorneys will have a forum to voice their concerns.201  At the same time, 
common police practices will improve because judges will have a greater 
opportunity to probe further into suggestive procedures during the Wade 
hearing, and certain procedures are considered inherently suspect.202  
                                                                                                             
“Although the approach might yield greater deterrence, it could also lead to the loss of a 
substantial amount of reliable evidence.”  Id. at 922. 
194 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21, 923 (stating that courts should consider the following 
system variables when evaluating suggestiveness:  blind administration, pre-identification 
instructions, line-up construction, feedback, recording confidence, multiple viewings, 
show-ups, private actors, and any other identifications made). 
195 Id. at 922–23. 
196 Id. at 904. 
197 Id. at 904–07 (stating that these variables offer a more objective approach for courts to 
follow because they are not as easily influenced by the intentional or unintentional actions 
of law enforcement); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–200 (giving examples of 
estimator variables including:  visual acuity, depth perception, darkness adaptation, color 
blindness, stress, presence of a weapon, cross-racial dynamic, and memory alterations). 
198 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920. 
199 Id. at 878. 
200 Id. at 920. 
201 Id. at 922.  
202 Id. 
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New Jersey’s approach also incorporates reliable scientific data while 
protecting the interests of the parties involved.203 
2. New Jersey Incorporated Scientific Data by Adding Eight New 
Factors 
New Jersey’s approach incorporates modern scientific research on 
the way memory works, including eight additional estimator 
variables.204  Although courts, by necessity, will continue to rely on 
witness self-reporting, this approach enables the court to evaluate the 
factors that may have affected a witness’s experience.205  In addition, the 
three Biggers factors, which are easily manipulated, may be evaluated in 
light of the other estimator and system variables, instead of in 
isolation.206  For example, the witness’s degree of attention will be 
considered alongside stress, the presence of a weapon, and race-bias.207  
A judge may choose to place little weight on a confident eyewitness after 
analyzing the other estimator and system variables.208  And the witness’s 
opportunity to view the event will be evaluated in conjunction with the 
lighting, duration, and distance from the event.209  New Jersey’s test not 
only takes into account modern scientific data, it also attempts to equip 
jurors with the requisite tools to understand the data.210 
3. New Jersey’s Test Accounts for the Limited Knowledge of the Juror 
New Jersey’s decision takes into account jurors’ limitations by 
requiring a judge to educate the jury on relevant estimator variables 
                                                 
203 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing New Jersey’s decision to incorporate modern scientific 
data). 
204 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921. 
205 Id. at 904; see Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 9–12 (expressing concern over the 
Manson Court’s decision to rely so heavily on “retrospective self-reports” and explaining 
that “[p]art of the problem is that retrospective self-reports are highly malleable in 
response to even slight changes in context (e.g., who is asking the question), the social 
desirability of the responses, the need to appear consistent, and reinterpretations of the 
past based on new events”). 
206 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22 (adding eight additional estimator variables to the 
existing five Biggers factors and stating that New Jersey courts should consider them all 
together). 
207 Id. 
208 See id. (providing an approach that allows a judge to evaluate the entire situation 
instead of only the five Biggers factors). 
209 Id. 
210 See id. at 925–26 (requiring the Criminal Practice Committee and the Committee on 
Model Criminal Jury Charges to create revised jury instructions incorporating the findings 
from its decision in Henderson). 
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through jury instructions.211  Although jurors are the final arbitrators of 
guilt or innocence, the admissibility of an identification no longer 
depends on the lay-person’s understanding of how memory works.212  
There is no doubt that eyewitness identification will continue to be an 
extremely convincing piece of evidence, but these instructions will 
provide a framework by which jurors can process the data they are 
given.213  In summary, New Jersey has modified the Manson test by 
incorporating modern scientific data, which helps prevent suggestive 
police procedures and educates jurors.214  Although this decision is a step 
in the right direction, it is not without its weaknesses. 
C. Criticisms of the New Jersey Approach 
Critics contend that New Jersey’s approach is overly burdensome on 
law enforcement, the judicial system, and prosecutors.215  However, Part 
III.C.1 discusses the advantages and disadvantages for law 
enforcement.216  Part III.C.2 explains that the long-term benefits of an 
approach like the one adopted by New Jersey outweighs the initial 
burden on the judiciary.217  Part III.C.3 analyzes New Jersey’s decision to 
adopt all five of the Biggers factors.218 
1. The Burden on Law Enforcement is De Minimus 
New Jersey’s decision places a greater burden on law enforcement, 
requiring time, administrative inconvenience, and additional training.219  
However, this burden is outweighed by the need to protect the wrongly 
accused and ensure the accuracy of the criminal justice system.220  For 
                                                 
211 See id. at 924–25 (requiring the use of jury instructions, but also allowing the use of 
expert testimony in appropriate circumstances). 
212 Id. at 924.  “But we do not rely on jurors to divine rules themselves or glean them from 
cross-examination or summation.  Even with matters that may be considered intuitive, 
courts provide focused jury instructions.”  Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 878–79. 
215 Id. at 914–16, 927. 
216 See infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the burden is relatively small and, ultimately, New 
Jersey’s reform is in the best interest of law enforcement). 
217 See infra Part III.C.2 (exploring the ramifications of this decision on the judiciary and 
once again determining that the benefits outweigh the costs). 
218 See infra III.C.3 (questioning and evaluating New Jersey’s decision to include all five of 
the Biggers factors). 
219 See Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (providing examples of procedures that require extra time 
but will help eliminate erroneous identifications). 
220 See 250 Exonerated, supra note 4 (finding that the 250 exonerated individuals spent an 
average of thirteen years in prison before they were exonerated and concluding that the 
cost of reform is worth the inconvenience). 
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example, blind administration requires the time of an administrator who 
is not involved in the investigation and does not know which person is 
the suspect.221  Constructing fair line-ups by making sure that the 
members of the line-up are similar in attire and physical appearance will 
cost police the time and effort it takes to find suitable fillers.222  
Minimizing the use of show-up identifications may inconvenience police 
because of the relative ease by which a show-up is administered; 
however, taking the time and effort to organize a line-up generally 
outweighs the need for administrative efficiency because of the inherent 
suggestiveness of show-ups.223  Eliminating feedback and multiple 
viewings, administering pre-lineup instructions, and recording the 
confidence of the witness are reforms that may be implemented with 
relative ease.224  In sum, the harm prevented by implementing these extra 
safeguards outweighs the relatively minimal strain on law 
enforcement.225  The harm prevented also offsets the inconvenience to 
the judiciary.226 
2. The Long Term Benefits Outweigh the Initial Burden on the 
Judiciary 
Permitting a defendant to obtain a pre-trial hearing will consume 
judicial time and resources.227  Although these hearings may require 
more time and resources than the Manson test, the benefits of ensuring 
an identification’s reliability outweigh the burdens.228  However, in the 
cases in which an identification is in question, the judge may dismiss the 
                                                 
221 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (explaining that although blind 
administration requires extra effort, it is one of the easiest reforms for law enforcement to 
implement). 
222 See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers that arise when 
police fail to construct a line-up with physically similar individuals). 
223 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (explaining that although a show-up is 
easily administered, the procedure itself is inherently suggestive). 
224 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–901 (N.J. 2011); see Fact Sheet, supra note 4 
(offering other suggestions for eyewitness identification reform). 
225 See supra Part III.C.1 (explaining why the burden on law enforcement is relatively 
small). 
226 See infra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the burden on the judiciary is outweighed by 
ensuring that innocent individuals are not wrongly convicted). 
227 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923 (“[W]e are mindful of the practical impact of today’s ruling.  
Because defendants will now be free to explore a broader range of estimator variables at 
pretrial hearings to assess the reliability of an identification, those hearings will become 
more intricate.”). 
228 Id. at 878–79 (“The changes outlined in this decision are significant because eyewitness 
identifications bear directly on guilt or innocence.  At stake is the very integrity of the 
criminal justice system and the courts’ ability to conduct fair trials.”). 
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hearing at any time if the defense does not have a legitimate claim.229  In 
addition, a thorough investigation into an identification’s reliability may 
avoid confusion later in the trial and ultimately ensure that the guilty 
party is not still roaming the streets.230  Moreover, research shows that 
criminal defendants will be less likely to reoffend if they believe they 
have been treated fairly by the system.231  The wrongful convictions of 
the past thirty years are reminders of the high cost of admitting an 
erroneous identification:  the innocent lose their liberty and the guilty go 
free.232  Nevertheless, New Jersey’s new test would be more accurate if 
the court had excluded two of the Biggers factors.233 
3. Two of the Biggers Factors Have Little Objective Scientific Value 
Although New Jersey incorporated modern scientific findings into 
its approach to eyewitness testimony, it included two factors from 
Biggers that have little objective value:  degree of attention and 
eyewitness confidence.234  Although these two factors are part of the 
Supreme Court’s original test, they are no longer relevant to a reliability 
inquiry because the additional factors make them obsolete.235  
Concededly, a witness’s credibility is implicated if he or she admits to 
not paying attention; however, the reverse is not necessarily true.236  For 
example, even if an eyewitness claims a certain level of attention, a court 
will confirm or discount that testimony based on other factors such as 
the presence of a weapon, amount of stress (implicated by amount of 
violence), and duration of the event.237  Like degree of attention, 
                                                 
229 Id. at 920. 
230 See, e.g., Troy, supra note 6 (providing a case in which there was a doubt as to whether 
the defendant was guilty, partly because several of the eyewitnesses later expressed 
hesitancy about their identification of the defendant). 
231 See supra note 56 (discussing the high rate of incarceration in the United States and 
arguing that rehabilitation is not a central focus in our prison system). 
232 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (arguing that the current Manson 
framework is partly to blame for the high rate of wrongful convictions). 
233 See infra Part III.C.3 (explaining that two of the Biggers factors have very little objective 
value). 
234 See supra note 119 (noting the circuit split over how to interpret the Biggers factors). 
235 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 921–22 (adopting the five Biggers factors because 
the New Jersey Court felt as if the overlap was not harmful to the additional eight factors). 
236 See Wells & Bradfield, supra note 70, at 374–75 (“[A]s long as the eyewitness comes 
across strongly on some or most of the five Biggers’ criteria, it is assumed that the 
suggestive procedure was not problematic.”). 
237 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22. 
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testimony about confidence is not relevant unless the witness is 
expressing a lack of confidence.238 
DNA evidence has provided a lens through which the justice system 
can conclusively look at the past thirty years and evaluate the flaws in 
eyewitness identification jurisprudence.239  But one question still remains 
even with these much needed reforms instituted by New Jersey:  In the 
future, how will judges and attorneys know if New Jersey’s approach is 
working?240  The “success” of an identification hearing depends on your 
point of view:  The defense attorney is advocating for suppression of the 
identification while the prosecutor is arguing for its admissibility.  
Regardless of how you define success, New Jersey’s decision is a step in 
the right direction, because it solidifies the rights of criminal defendants, 
holds law enforcement accountable, and provides jurors with much 
needed information to make an accurate decision.241 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
As discussed in Part III, New Jersey should not have incorporated all 
five factors from the Supreme Court’s Biggers test because two of these 
factors are based on the witness’s self-reporting.242  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s decision to adopt degree of attention and eyewitness 
confidence prolongs the life of two factors, which really have no 
objective value.243  However, a model approach would take into account 
police suggestiveness, incorporate reliable scientific evidence, and 
exclude outdated factors utilized by the Supreme Court.244  
Consequently, this Note urges states to adopt the prescribed model 
approach, similar to what was adopted in New Jersey, so that states will 
have a more objective and reliable method of analyzing an eyewitness 
identification.245 
                                                 
238 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (considering confidence as a factor and 
concluding that confidence has very little correlation with accuracy when a witness is 
expressing a high level of confidence). 
239 See supra note 152 (suggesting that 250 DNA exonerations should serve as a reminder 
that the current Manson test is not working). 
240 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922 (“We recognize that scientific research relating to the 
reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic; the field is very different today than it was in 
1977, and it will likely be quite different thirty years from now.”). 
241 Id. at 878. 
242 See supra Part III.C.3. 
243 Steblay, supra note 126, at 471. 
244 See infra Part IV.A–C (suggesting that a modified version of New Jersey’s test will 
accomplish these aims). 
245 See id. (modeling after New Jersey’s decision but revising two of the Biggers factors). 
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A. Some Evidence of Suggestiveness Triggers a Pre-trial Wade Hearing 
The first step in the model judicial reasoning is to determine whether 
there is some evidence of suggestiveness at a pretrial hearing.246  To 
determine this, courts should consider whether:  (1) a blind 
administrator performed the line-up procedure; (2) the administrator 
instructed the witness that “the suspect may not be present in the lineup 
and [you] should not feel compelled to make an identification;” (3) the 
line-up was constructed with at least five fillers who were similar in 
appearance to the suspect; (4) the witness received any confirmatory 
feedback; (5) the witness viewed the suspect multiple times; (6) the 
police administered a show-up identification with instructions that the 
individual in custody may or may not be the perpetrator; (7) the witness 
chose any other suspect before choosing the alleged perpetrator; and (8) 
any other relevant factors influenced the identification.247  Up to this 
point, the defense may not introduce any evidence pertaining to 
estimator variables.248 
These hearings may become burdensome if every trial with an 
eyewitness identification must first hold a pretrial hearing.  However, if 
at any time during the hearing the judge in his discretion determines that 
the defendant has provided no evidence of suggestiveness or is wasting 
the court’s time, he may terminate the hearing.249  Once the court has 
concluded that the defendant has not offered any credible evidence of 
suggestiveness, the defendant may not introduce any evidence 
pertaining to estimator variables.250  Thus, even though in many 
instances these pretrial hearings add an extra step in a judicial 
proceeding, a court need not waste its time listening to baseless claims.251 
If the defendant persuades the court that some evidence of 
suggestiveness was present, the burden shifts to the State to show that 
the identification was nevertheless reliable.252  During this phase of the 
hearing, both the prosecutor and defense may offer estimator variables 
for the court’s consideration.253  The ultimate burden rests on the 
defendant to show “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”254 
                                                 
246 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920 (N.J. 2011). 
247 Id. at 920–921. 
248 Id. at 921. 
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B. Consider All Relevant Estimator Variables During the Pretrial Hearing 
Once the defendant has presented evidence of suggestiveness and 
the court is persuaded that some part of the identification process was 
suggestive, the court should consider all relevant estimator variables.255  
Variables a court should consider include:  (1) the amount of stress 
during the event; (2) whether a weapon was present and visible; (3) the 
amount of time the witness had to observe the event; (4) the proximity of 
the witness to the perpetrator; (5) the lighting and other characteristics 
pertaining to the scene of the crime; (6) any distinguishing characteristics 
of the perpetrator; (7) memory decay; and (8) race bias.256  A court should 
not be discouraged from using some factors from the Biggers analysis, 
such as the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal, the accuracy of 
any prior descriptions of the perpetrator, and the time between the crime 
and the confrontation even though, for the most part, these three factors 
are encompassed by other factors mentioned previously.257 
However, courts should not consider the witness’s degree of 
attention or the level of confidence demonstrated by the eyewitness 
because these factors do not contribute anything that is not already taken 
into account by the previous factors.258  Even assuming that the witness 
has not received any feedback from law enforcement or private actors, 
some people, because of personality, are more confident than others.  In 
addition, the confident eyewitness may be more likely to feel that he 
paid adequate attention.  Thus, a court should not consider these factors 
when offered to establish the credibility of an eyewitness.  However, in 
its discretion, a court may consider these two factors when offered to 
discredit a witness because, even though these factors are not indicia of 
reliability, they do indicate a lack of reliability. 
For example, imagine bystander X witnesses a crime and tells police 
at a properly administered line-up, “I am absolutely positive that is the 
man. I was standing in the bank when he robbed it.”  Notwithstanding 
X’s good intentions, other factors may have negatively influenced his 
perception of the perpetrator, such as:  whether the perpetrator had a 
weapon visible, what kind of lighting the bank had, how close X was to 
the perpetrator when he ran out, X’s degree of stress, how long it took 
for the perpetrator to rob the bank, whether X was up against the wall or 
on the ground, how long it took the police to respond, the perpetrator’s 
race, and X’s disguise, if any.  Certainly X felt as if he was paying close 
                                                 
255 Id. at 921. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 921–22. 
258 See supra notes 57–58, 119 and accompanying text (explaining why these two factors 
contribute very little to a court’s analysis of reliability). 
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attention and may even feel confident as he tells police, but as explained 
earlier in this Note, the scientific data confirms that both of these factors 
are easily manipulated subconsciously by the existence of other factors. 
Imagine the same situation, except that this time, when interviewed 
by police, X admits that he was jamming to some tunes on his iPod, was 
standing off to the side, and did not even know that a robbery was 
occurring.  At the line-up, X says that he is not sure if he identified the 
right man.  Both the fact that he was not paying close attention during 
the commission of the crime and the fact that he is now uncertain of 
whether he identified the correct man are incredibly relevant pieces of 
information that a court should consider.  Courts should consider all 
relevant estimator variables during this stage excluding the witness’s 
degree of attention and confidence unless those are offered to discredit 
the eyewitness. 
One of the appealing features of this approach is that courts may add 
or delete factors as scientific research progresses.259  The flexibility of this 
approach will place a substantial amount of discretion in the hands of 
each individual state in order to determine which variables have gained 
enough approval in the scientific arena to warrant consideration.260 
C. Educate the Jurors at Trial 
Once an identification passes through the pre-trial hearing and is 
admitted into evidence, the jury needs to be educated about the variables 
that affect memory.261  A judge should have the discretion to choose 
whether experts testify or whether the judge should exclude experts in 
lieu of jury instructions.262  The judge should take into account whether 
both sides can afford to call experts, whether the jurors will be overly 
influenced by an expert’s testimony, and whether the expert may invade 
the jurors’ role by making a determination about an eyewitness’s 
credibility. 
This general approach, much like the one adopted by New Jersey, 
will provide a flexible yet reliable guide to state courts when analyzing 
an eyewitness identification.  Courts must provide a pre-trial Wade 
hearing when the defendant introduces some evidence of 
suggestiveness; however, they should not consider an eyewitness’s 
confidence and degree of attention when examining relevant estimator 
variables.  This approach recognizes the landmark contribution New 
Jersey made to the legal community in its decision in Henderson but 
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encourages states to go a little further by excluding two of the Biggers 
factors when adopting a similar approach.  New Jersey’s decision 
represents a giant step in the right direction, but this Note’s amended 
version of New Jersey’s approach will provide states with the model 
reasoning necessary to create a more consistent framework for excluding 
erroneous identifications. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The complexities involved in an eyewitness identification have been 
largely unaddressed by most courts for over thirty years.263  This failure 
is evidenced by the fact that seventy-five percent of individuals who 
were exonerated by DNA evidence were incarcerated, at least in part, 
due to an erroneous eyewitness identification.264  However, New Jersey 
has provided a framework for other states and jurisdictions to follow, as 
reform inevitably takes place across the United States.  This new 
approach accomplishes the goals Manson was meant to accomplish by 
deterring police misconduct, incorporating reliable scientific data, and 
accounting for jurors’ limitations.265  In addition, New Jersey’s model is 
not overly burdensome on law enforcement or the judicial system as a 
whole, protecting the competing interests of law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 
Unfortunately, New Jersey did not go far enough when it amended 
its approach to eyewitness identification.  By leaving intact two of the 
Biggers factors, courts will continue to rely on two almost entirely 
subjective factors in their analysis of whether an identification is reliable.  
New Jersey has pioneered the way to a new and improved approach to 
eyewitness identification, but other courts will do well to amend New 
Jersey’s test by excluding eyewitness confidence and degree of attention 
as estimator variables.  Judges and juries will be able to reach a 
determination of reliability without sifting through the subjectivity 
implicit in these two factors. 
Now, back to Marlon’s story.  What if Illinois had adopted a version 
of New Jersey’s approach before Marlon was arrested?  Marlon’s story 
may have ended differently.  In its pre-trial hearing, the court noted that 
the police had no reason to utilize a show-up identification instead of 
placing Marlon in a typical line-up.  Also, the officer failed to instruct 
                                                 
263 See supra Part II.B (summarizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on eyewitness 
identification). 
264 See GARRETT, supra note 4 (studying the cases of 250 incarcerated individuals and 
concluding that seventy-five percent were imprisoned partly due to an erroneous 
identification). 
265 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–23. 
Zerkle: I Never Forget a Face:  New Jersey Sets the Standard in Eyewitnes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
398 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
Louis that Marlon may or may not be the suspect.  After accepting these 
facts as some evidence of suggestiveness, it went on to consider that:  (1) 
Louis was beaten by five or six individuals which inevitably resulted in a 
considerable amount of stress; (2) the victim is a different race than the 
attackers; (3) the entire event occurred over a span of only seconds or 
minutes; (4) the attack happened at night; and (5) unconscious 
transference may have caused Louis to confuse Marlon with one of his 
attackers because Louis had previously noticed Marlon’s orange vest 
while riding the train. 
Although the court did not think these facts were enough to 
suppress the identification altogether, the court crafted jury instructions 
and informed the jury of the different dangers inherent in an 
identification of this type.  The judge even gave the defense attorney 
permission to call an expert because of the precarious nature of the 
identification in this case.  Marlon’s case went to the jury and . . . 
Marlon was given a fair trial.  And a fair trial could have been the 
beginning of a happy ending for at least 250 other individuals who were 
wrongfully convicted because judges and juries were ill-equipped to 
deal with the complexities of memory. 
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